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ABSTRACT 
I argue that both major approaches to public reason liberalism include duties of restraint 
for legislators.  Consensus views require exclusion of non-public reasons, and convergence 
requires proposal restraint.  Violations of these duties create due diligence duties of moral repair, 
which require the wrongdoer to make a genuine and reasonable effort to normalize moral relations 
with those wronged.  I argue that apology is one favorable route for moral repair.  However, it is 
difficult to assess the sincerity of apologies, so they often need supplemented with other morally 
compensatory actions.  I defend the view that, on consensus accounts, legislators must provide a 
renewed defense of their positions in terms of public reasons, and, on convergence accounts, 
legislators must retract their support for positions that violate convergent restraint. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Public reason liberalism is a strand of contemporary moral and political thought that focuses on 
the issues of public deliberation and public justification in liberal democratic societies.  It 
developed out of the social contract tradition, most notably through the work of John Rawls.  
Political liberals generally agree that public justification requires that a law be justifiable to each 
citizen subject to it and that there is some principle of restraint on the kinds of reasons that are 
permissible in public deliberation.1   Laws that do not meet a given conception’s standard of public 
justification are unjustifiably coercive and immoral according to that conception of public reason.  
Political liberals sometimes disagree, however, about the standards of public justification and the 
principles that are necessary to regulate public deliberation. According to some political liberals, 
public justification requires a consensus on a single shared reason. On this view, each individual 
citizen must recognize a single, shared reason as meeting the justificatory standard for a law. Other 
political liberals maintain that public justification simply requires agreement that a law is justified 
according to a shared family of reasons.    On this alternative view, individual citizens may support 
the law for different reasons.  
Recently, theorists have started to refer to views similar to Rawlsian political liberalism as 
consensus public reason liberalism.  This is in response to the emergence of an alternative approach 
to answering the questions raised by the issues of public justification and public deliberation.  
Gerald Gaus and Kevin Vallier (among others) developed the alternative convergence view 
primarily in response to Rawlsian takes on these issues raised in public reason debates.  
Convergence liberals tend to focus on the issue of public justification, and they argue that a law is 
justified if and only if all citizens subject to it have reason to support it.  Thus, unlike political 
 
1 I use “public reason liberalism” and “political liberalism” interchangeably.  This tradition includes figures such as 
John Rawls, Lori Watson, Christie Hartley, Jonathan Quong, Stephen Macedo, Andrew Lister, and many others.  
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liberals, convergence theorists require all citizens to converge on the judgement that a law is 
justified even if they have different reasons.  On the other hand, political liberals require a 
consensus on the reason(s) for justification.  
Understandably, much of the literature concerning the debate between consensus and 
convergence liberals focuses on their differences.  However, my aim here is to examine a possible 
point of agreement among proponents of these two opposing views.   This point of agreement 
concerns the aftermath of wrongdoing in public reason discourse.  By public reason discourse, I 
mean discourse pertaining to fundamental political questions that takes place in the public political 
forum and restrained by duties to offer public reasons.  Both schools of thought agree that there 
can be attempts at public justification or actions in public deliberation that are morally problematic.  
There are certain types of reasons and proposals that one cannot offer in the public political forum 
without wronging other citizens by disrespecting them.  If it is morally wrong to treat citizens in 
such a manner, then perhaps public reason liberalism suggests steps that a wrongdoer must take to 
rectify such wrongdoing.   
The commitments of both consensus and convergence liberalism constrain conduct in the 
public sphere.  I argue that these constraints also include one’s conduct in light of wrongdoing. 
When one violates their duties of conduct in the public sphere, they are morally required to engage 
in moral repair.  In what follows, I examine the concept of moral repair and its relation to consensus 
and convergence views.  Focusing on the conduct of public officials, I argue that proponents of 
both views ought to favor requirements for some sort of moral repair. I examine part of what this 
repair might entail.  I argue that moral repair in such cases requires a public official in violation of 
their duty of civility (as it is called by political liberals) in the public political forum to offer an 
apology.  This apology requires recognition that one’s previous reasoning violated the norms of 
3 
public reason.  Therefore, if they intend to remain in support of the position previously defended, 
they now have a duty to defend that position in terms of acceptably or appropriately public reasons.  
If they cannot do so, they ought to apologize for the wrongdoing and retract support for the 
position. 
 The paper proceeds as follows.  In the first section, I draw on the work of Rawls to clarify 
the domain of public reason and frame the discussion that follows in a specific context—the public 
political forum of a liberal constitutional democracy.  In section II, I then examine the arguments 
offered by both consensus and convergence theorists for limitations on conduct in this forum.  In 
the third section, I introduce the concept of moral repair and argue that both schools of thought 
favor some form of moral repair in the aftermath of wrongdoing in the public political forum 
according to the arguments presented in the second section.  Finally, in the fourth section, I 
examine the different types of repair that might be appropriate or required in such cases and how 
wrongdoers might go about fulfilling such duties of repair.  I argue for a due-diligence form of 
moral repair that includes a requirement to offer an apology.  Furthermore, the official is morally 
required to offer public reasons in support of their policy position or proposal if they are not willing 
to retract support for it.  If they refuse to either retract support for the position or defend it in terms 
of public reason, then the apology is meaningless and the wrong persists.   
 
2 THE DOMAIN OF PUBLIC REASON 
This section provides a brief overview of the public reason project.  I begin by drawing attention 
to several key issues in debates concerning public reason in order to clarify the differences between 
consensus and convergence views.  I then turn to Rawls’s account of the public political forum.  
This is what we might call the domain of public reason.  Finally, I conclude this section by limiting 
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the scope of this paper to a particular context in which I think consensus and convergence theorists 
can agree—public officials debating public policy or law in the public political forum. 
Convergence and consensus liberals disagree on many key issues in the public reason 
debate.  Among them are questions concerning what constitutes a public reason, who is required 
to give public reasons, in what discussion contexts or circumstances such persons are required to 
utilize public reasons, and what types of policies or laws require public reason-based justifications.  
The first of these issues is the content of public reason, and consensus theorists typically take a 
stricter approach to determining which reasons qualify as public than convergence theorists.   For 
example, Rawls limits the content of public reasons to values given by the family of liberal 
conceptions of justice that are present in the culture of a liberal constitutional democracy.2  
According to Rawls, there are three characteristics of political conceptions of justice:  
First, their principles apply to basic political and social institutions (the 
basic structure of society);  
Second, they can be presented independently from comprehensive doctrines 
of any kind (although they may, of course, be supported by a reasonable 
overlapping consensus of such doctrines); and  
Finally, they can be worked out from fundamental ideas seen as implicit in 
the public political culture of a constitutional regime, such as the conceptions of 
citizens as free and equal persons, and of society as a fair system of cooperation.3 
 
Rawls calls conceptions of justice that meet these three criteria freestanding.4  This means that 
they do not depend on a comprehensive moral, political, or religious conception of the good life.  
Rawls also identifies several criteria a conception of justice must meet to be a liberal one.  These 
are the following: 
First, a list of certain basic rights, liberties, and opportunities (such as those 
familiar from constitutional regimes); 
 
2 Rawls (1997) p. 776. 
3 Rawls (1997), p. 776. 
4 Rawls (2005), p. 12.  In Rawls (1997), he also calls such views ‘self-standing.’  This is another way of 
emphasizing that political conceptions of justice are independent of comprehensive moral conceptions of the good. 
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Second, an assignment of special priority to those rights, liberties, and 
opportunities, especially with respect to the claims of the general good and 
perfectionist values; and 
Third, measures ensuring for all citizens adequate all-purpose means to 
make effective use of their freedoms.5 
 
It is reasonable to conclude that a liberal society will include multiple conceptions of justice that 
satisfy Rawls’s criteria of being both liberal and freestanding political conceptions of justice.  The 
content of public reason consists of the shared principles that develop out of liberal, freestanding 
conceptions of justice.   
The diversity of comprehensive doctrines that exist in a liberal democratic society —along 
with a requirement that laws are justifiable—motivates the public reason project.  In a society 
guaranteeing freedom of thought and conscience, we cannot reasonably expect citizens to agree 
on the correct comprehensive doctrine.   Rawls calls this the fact of reasonable pluralism.6  Such 
pluralism is a permanent fact of life in a liberal democracy.  Public reason theorists on both sides 
of the consensus-convergence debate recognize and accept the fact of reasonable pluralism as a 
jumping off point for public reason theorizing.   
Rawls defends taking reasonable pluralism for granted by appealing to what he calls the 
burdens of judgment.  He provides an incomplete list of six burdens, which include conflicting 
scientific evidence, different weighting systems of values, vague cases, and so on.7  The burdens 
of judgement explain why it is reasonable for citizens to disagree on the many matters that make 
up their different comprehensive conceptions of the good.  Given the burdens of judgement, 
rational and reasonable persons in a free society can understandably reach different conclusions 
about the good.8  Individuals can reasonably disagree on important decision-making elements and 
 
5 Rawls (1997), p. 774. 
6 Rawls (2005), p. 63. 
7 Rawls (2005), 56-7. 
8 Rawls (2005), 56. 
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do not have complete epistemic access to all the information necessary to make a “perfect” 
decision about the good, whatever that would be.  Since this disagreement is reasonable, it is not 
reasonable to justify coercive law according to reasons it would be reasonable for a citizen to 
reject.  Therefore, we only count as public those reasons that are implicit in the culture of a liberal 
democratic society and we can reasonably expect citizens who adhere to a variety of 
comprehensive doctrines about the good life to support.9   
There is an additional sense in which political liberals might also require that a reason be 
public.  Reasons morally acceptable in public discourse are supported by the family of liberal 
conceptions of justice present in society, and citizens generally recognize them as acceptable 
reasons for individuals to appeal to in the process of public justification.  Such reasons qualify as 
shared reasons.  Shared reasons are reasons that are supported in liberal democratic societies 
independent of an individual’s particular comprehensive conception of the good life.  Citizens can 
share such reasons since they do not stem from controversial conceptions of the good.  Reasons 
that are commonly referred to as giving rise to shared public reasons in a liberal democratic society 
include values such as freedom, equality, fairness, solidarity, and civic friendship, among others.  
However, the particular set of values that are shared in a given society are determined by the set 
of liberal conceptions of justice that are present in that society.   
On the other hand, convergence concepts of public reason discourse expand the content of 
public reason to include non-shared reasons.  For example, Kevin Vallier concludes that a lower 
standard is all that is necessary for a reason to have a place in a conception of public reason.  
According to Vallier, a reason counts as a public reason as long as it is intelligible. Reasons are 
intelligible when “they are reasons that other citizens can see as reasons for them at the right level 
 
9 Rawls (2005), 58-61. 
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of idealization.”10 This means that Reason R is intelligible to Citizen A if other citizens can 
recognize that R would fit with A’s framework of reasoning if A’s reasoning was idealized.  
Different conceptions idealize in various ways, but idealization is typically hashed out in terms of 
a combination of either rationality or reasonability and an information requirement.  In other 
words, if A would (or could) accept R as a reason if they were to have relevant and adequate (or 
some other standard, such as “full”) information and were to reason according to some standard of 
rationality (or reasonableness), then R is intelligible. Thus, reasons are intelligible when citizens 
can recognize that they are justified to the ones who hold or advance them.11  Vallier’s conception 
of convergence liberalism considers intelligible reasons sufficient for accepting or objecting to the 
public justification of a law. 
The other questions mentioned briefly above—those concerning from whom and when 
public reason is required—have to do with the application or scope of public reason.  Consensus 
theorists often disagree amongst themselves on the details of how to answer these questions, so 
there are various ways to conceptualize public reason liberalism.  For example, Jonathan Quong 
argues that public reasons are required in order to justify most, if not all, coercive laws.  Rawls, 
on the other hand, limits the scope to what he calls constitutional essentials and matters of basic 
justice.  The former includes questions that ought to be answered in a written constitution while 
the latter includes questions concerning the organization, governance, and functioning of major 
economic and social institutions that make up the “basic structure” of society.12  It is important to 
recognize that not all forms of consensus liberalism are the same.13  Neither are all forms of 
 
10 Vallier (2015), p. 143. 
11 Vallier (2015), p. 143. 
12 Rawls (1997), p. 767. 
13 See Watson and Hartley (2018) for a discussion on different formulations of political liberalism and how their 
view is both similar to and departs from Quong and Rawls. 
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convergence liberalism, and I have tried to highlight various ways in which conceptions might 
differ.  For simplicity, I focus here on the more overarching distinction between consensus and 
convergence views because there is more difference between the two camps than amongst 
individuals within each camp.  Moreover, I argue that these two camps both favor moral repair, 
and this is the case regardless of how individual conceptions flesh out the details to the many 
different questions public reason raises because any deviations among views are not significant 
enough to do away with restraint and conclusion all-together. 
In terms of the application of public reason, consensus liberalism typically requires more 
of citizens generally than convergence liberalism by requiring citizens to offer public reasons in 
more situations and with a stricter bar for a reason to qualify as public.  For example, a consensus 
theorist might go as far as to argue that public reasons are always morally required in public 
deliberations concerning law, such as between two strangers discussing policy on an internet forum 
or two friends at a church service.  However, this would be the most restrictive and extreme 
position, and convergence theorists would certainly not accept such a stance.  Neither do most 
political liberals.  Rawls’s account presented below rejects this stronger formulation of the 
demands that follow from the idea of public reason.  More common are positions that limit 
requirements to offer public reasons to discussions taking place in the public political forum; 
however, some conceptions might require all citizens discussing public policy in the public 
political forum to offer public reasons.  I focus here on the latter since this is a point of agreement 
among the various views.  While some consensus theorists might wish to expand the domain of 
public reason, convergence and consensus alike can agree that engaging in public reason is morally 
required from public officials, such as judges, elected officials, or appointed government 
bureaucrats who have the power to influence law, policy, and their enforcement.  I refer to 
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conceptions of how to answer questions regarding from who and in what contexts public reasons 
are required as determining the domain of public reason.  I now turn to John Rawls’s account of 
the domain of public reason since it is a possibility that convergence theorists can support this 
account. 
Rawls bases his account of the domain of public reason on a distinction between what he 
calls the background culture of a society and the public political forum.14  Recall that we are only 
concerned here with liberal democratic societies.  The public political forum of such societies 
consists of the reasoning and decision-making of judges, the discourse of government officials, 
and statements made by candidates for office or official campaign announcements or press releases 
made by campaign staff.  In the public political forum, the normative requirements given by a 
conception of public reason apply.  Individuals taking part in discourse in the public political form 
are required “engage in public reason,” which means that they appeal to the values given by the 
family of liberal conceptions of justice present in a liberal democratic society, as discussed 
above.15   I follow Rawls in calling duties to engage in public reason duties of civility.16  Duties of 
civility might seem to extend to the everyday interactions between citizens.  We might expect 
citizens to treat one another with respect, solidarity, and civic friendship.  However, in the 
following discussion, the duty of civility is limited to public political discourse.  I understand this 
duty as simply the requirement to defend one’s positions in public political discourse in terms of 
public reasons. 
Contrary to the public political forum, duties of civility do not exist in the ‘background 
culture’ of society.  The background culture of a liberal constitutional democracy is its civil 
 
14 This paragraph and the next draws on discussion throughout Rawls (1997). 
15 Rawls (1997), p. 776. 
16 Rawls (1997), p. 769.  
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society, which is made up by the non-political or non-governmental activities in which citizens 
regularly participate.  Public reasons are not required in discourse taking place outside the public 
political forum.  For example, churches, learning institutions, social clubs, and various other 
voluntary associations that citizens join are part of the background culture.17  Members of such 
groups are not bound by duties of civility in such contexts when engaging in political discourse.  
Two individuals playing a round of golf in their regular weekly league have no moral duty to 
refrain from appealing to their comprehensive conceptions of the good life when discussing a law 
or policy issue.   
In what follows, I focus on violations of the duty of civility that take place within the public 
political forum.  I argue that convergence and consensus theorists both support restrictions on the 
types of reasons that are morally acceptable in such a forum.  Therefore, violations of duties to 
offer public reasons in discourse within the domain of public reason is morally wrong and requires 
some form of moral repair.  Consider the following example of such a violation. 
Imagine that the United States Senate is debating a bill that would allow Bible education 
in public schools and a Senator steps up to the podium and agues in favor of the bill.  The Senator 
argues that the legislature ought to pass the bill because the Bible is the word of God.  It is the 
whole truth; and, therefore, ought to be part of the educational requirements in American schools.  
Public officials and candidates for offices commonly offer such arguments in favor of religious 
education.  Such occurrences are perhaps more likely to occur at the local level in relatively 
religiously homogenous communities, but it is not infrequent for such arguments to also be made 
at the state or national level.  In addition, it is not difficult to imagine similar religion-based 
 
17 Rawls (1997), p. 768. 
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arguments for a number of other issues, such as same-sex marriage and abortion, since these 
arguments are familiar in the public political culture of the United States.   
I take it for granted that many citizens of a liberal constitutional democracy, such as that 
of the United States, find such reasoning problematic, especially coming from an elected 
government official.  Moreover, it seems that it is not problematic simply because it is considered 
bad manners or out of place because, for example, such reasoning is acceptable in discourse 
between members of the same church.  It is not problematic simply because the Senator is not at 
church.  Although it appears that we do have a predictive expectation that government officials in 
liberal democratic societies will not make such arguments; more importantly, it seems there is a 
normative expectation many of us have that such arguments should not be made.  Furthermore, 
this normative expectation seems to stem from more than culture or tradition.  Such reasoning is 
not simply problematic because it is a violation of the supposed separation of church and state that 
is foundational in the American public forum.  The Senator’s reasoning is not simply out of place 
based on such constitutionally influenced sentiments or tradition.   
The Senator’s reason strikes us as inappropriate because it seems to violate a moral 
standard.  This is because it takes place in the public political forum, which is the domain of public 
reason.  This means that the Senator is bound by and in violation of their duty of civility.  It is 
morally wrong for an elected official who takes part in the law-making process to attempt to justify 
their policy positions by reference to a religion (or any comprehensive conception of the good life 
that they cannot reasonably expect citizens generally to share).  Public reason liberalism offers a 
way to explain why such conduct is morally wrong.  It is morally wrong because individuals have 
a moral duty to engage in public reason in the public political forum.  It is a violation of the moral 
duty of civility according to political liberalism. 
12 
3 EXCLUSIONARY PUBLIC REASON 
The Rawlsian moral duty of civility manifests in a requirement for individuals engaging in public 
reason discourse to refrain from appealing to certain kinds of reasons—those stemming purely 
from their comprehensive doctrines—in the process of public deliberation.18  In other words, the 
duty of civility requires citizens to exclude certain reasons from discourse in the public political 
forum.  There are reasons that they should not appeal to in such contexts.  We can call such 
accounts of public reason exclusionary.  I established above that our fictional Senator is in violation 
of his duty of civility as Rawlsian political liberals understand that duty, but this explanation relies 
only on Rawls’s account of the public political forum.  The Senator has failed to exclude certain 
types of reasons from their deliberations and attempt at public reason justification.  There is more 
to an account of public reason that explains its exclusionary character beyond an understanding of 
the public political forum.  There are underlying moral principles that give rise to the restrictions 
that regulate conduct in the public political forum. However, convergence theorists do not agree 
consensus theorists on the details for ruling out certain considerations from public political forums. 
They support an account of public reason that is exclusionary in a different sense .   
In this section, I examine the different ways in which we can understand consensus and 
convergence accounts as presenting exclusionary accounts of public reason.  Despite these 
differences, I argue that both approaches to exclusionary public reason include a duty of restraint 
in the public political forum and our fictional Senator is in violation of their duty of restraint on 
either account.  Thus, the Senator commits a moral wrong according to both accounts of public 
reason. 
 
18 It is important to recognize that the duty of civility is only a moral duty and not a legal one.  Public reason liberals 
reject legal measures requiring one to engage in public reason.   
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3.1 Convergent Restraint 
Kevin Vallier argues that one of the main differences between consensus and convergence liberals 
is the primary aim or way that they understand the public reason project.  As a result, the 
approaches lead to two different emphases on the kinds of principles and duties that develop out 
of the basics of public reason.  Vallier draws a distinction between principles of public deliberation 
and principles of public justification, and he maintains that consensus theorists tend to focus on 
the former and then argue that the latter develop out of deliberative principles.  Vallier calls this 
the standard approach.  The standard approach proceeds from a shared-reasons requirement 
regulating public deliberation to a shared-reasons requirement for a law to be publicly justified to 
citizens.  On the other hand, Vallier concerns himself primarily with a principle of restraint with 
regard to public justification.  He is critical of principles of deliberation and argues for a duty of 
restraint on proposals in the public political forum. 
Vallier’s convergence liberalism favors a duty of restraint on the proposals legislators offer 
rather than on the reasons that they give in favor of certain proposals.19  He calls this the Principle 
of Convergent Restraint (PCR).20  Vallier presents several forms of PCR before settling on the 
Principle of Convergent Restraint for Legislators (PCRL).  I only expand on PCRL since it is his 
final formulation and is perfectly applicable to the focus of this paper.  PCRL only applies to 
legislators who influence the law-making process.  It is as follows: 
Principle of Convergent Restraint for Legislators (PCRL): A legislator should not 
vote for law L, or publicly encourage effective others to vote for L, if he justifiably 
believes that members of the public lack sufficient reason Rn to endorse [L].21 
 
 
19 Vallier (2015), p. 139. 
20 Vallier 2015, p. 151. 
21 Vallier (2015), p. 154. I have taken the liberty of editing this definition by including the final ‘L’ in brackets.  This 
replaces an ‘M’ in the original publication.  I attribute this to typographical error.  There is no explanation of what 
‘M’ might be a notation for and it is not present in other formulations of PCLR.  ‘L’ or ‘Law,’ however, makes sense 
in its place and is consistent with the other formulations. 
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PCRL creates an exclusionary and moral duty of restraint in the public political forum.  It restrains 
conduct by requiring legislators to refuse to support legislation that they do not think all citizens 
have sufficient intelligible reasons to support.  Recall that intelligible reasons are those that citizens 
consider justificatory given that they reason ideally from within their own reasoning framework.  
This means that if a legislator thinks that there are citizens who have intelligible reasons to reject 
a piece of legislation, then, according to PCRL, the legislator ought not to vote for or encourage 
others to vote for the law.    
PCRL restrains proposals by requiring officials to refrain from voting for or supporting 
laws that citizens might have intelligible reasons for rejecting.  This differs from the Rawlsian duty 
of civility.  Civility restrains officials by requiring them to exclude certain types of reasons for 
supporting laws.  Using abortion legislation as an example, Vallier differentiates between proposal 
restraint and reason restraint.22  Civility prevents legislators from drawing on religious reasons in 
favor of abortion restrictions.  It is morally wrong to argue that abortion restrictions should be 
legislated on such grounds because religious reasons ought to be excluded from public political 
discourse.  On the other hand, proposal restraint requires that officials not support or vote for 
abortion restrictions because they recognize that other citizens have intelligible reasons for 
rejecting such legislation.   
The important matter here is that both consensus and convergence views lead to duties of 
restraint. Although he rejects restraint on reasons, Vallier’s conception of convergence liberalism 
is exclusionary.  By excluding proposals from the class of morally acceptable conduct in the public 
political forum, it creates a duty of restraint for legislators voting on law and public policy.  
Moreover, this duty of restraint explains the wrongdoing of the fictional senator discussed above.  
 
22 Vallier (2015), p. 144. 
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Even if we idealize only minimally, we can expect the Senator to recognize that there are citizens 
who have intelligible reasons to reject biblical education in schools.  We do not need to assume 
that the Senator is perfectly rational and has complete information about their society to conclude 
that they must know that other citizens have intelligible reasons to oppose the law.  PCRL states 
that legislators should not vote for or try to convince others to support a law that they can justifiably 
expect others to not have sufficient reason to support.  We can reasonably expect a person with 
adequate information about the freedoms available and the diversity of views present in a liberal 
constitutional democracy to be aware that not all citizens have sufficient reason to support biblical 
education in schools on the grounds that it is the word of God.  Thus, the Senator violates the moral 
duties of restraint that apply to legislators according to Vallier’s conception of convergence 
liberalism.  I now turn to restraint in political liberalism. 
 
3.2 Restraint in Consensus Liberalism 
In this section, I examine the manner in which consensus views of political liberalism are 
exclusionary.  Unlike Vallier’s convergence theory, this approach focuses on restraints on reasons.  
Duties of restraint are duties to exclude non-public reasons from one’s arsenal of reasons when 
engaging in public political discourse.  We have already seen one way that such duties manifest 
themselves.  In Rawls’s own work, judges, officials, and legislators have a moral duty of civility 
that requires them to offer public reasons to justify their judgements, proposals, or voting stances 
to other citizens.  All citizens have a moral duty to offer public reasons for their positions when 
debating policy issues in the public political forum.  In what follows, I set out the approach that 
political liberals typically use to defend the duty of civility.  This is the argument that a general 
16 
moral duty of respect for persons engenders a duty to offer public reasons in the public political 
forum.23 
Rawlsian political liberals typically base their conceptions of public reason on a prior moral 
duty of respect for persons.  Respect for persons is a general moral duty that engenders the duty of 
civility in the public political sphere.  Recall that the duty of civility requires certain individuals—
judges, legislators, executives, etc.—to “explain to other citizens their reasons for supporting 
fundamental political positions in terms of the political conception of justice they regard as the 
most reasonable.”24    
Since an elected official has the power to influence the creation and enforcement of laws, 
civility is a duty owed to all those citizens who are subject to those laws.25  As such a duty, civility 
creates an expectation for citizens that they be treated a certain way.  It must be the case that the 
laws a citizen is subject could be justifiable to them.  If an individual is subject to laws that could 
not be justifiable to them, then the imposition of that law on that citizen is a violation of the respect 
that they are owed.  The official bound by the duties of public reason disrespects the citizens 
subject to the law if the official provides comprehensive reasons for their stances rather than the 
appropriate public reasons. 
The traditional approach to Rawlsian political liberalism includes conceiving of persons in 
a state as free and equal democratic citizens.26 Political liberals take this conception of citizens for 
 
23 Lister (2013) defends an exclusionary account of political liberalism on the basis of civic friendship.   
24 Rawls (1997), p. 769. 
25 Following much of the public reason literature, I use “citizens” to refer to those individuals subject to the laws in a 
society.  Traditional accounts include ideal theorizing and conceiving of society as a closed system where all 
members of society are citizens.  This might not always be the case.  When foreigners enter a state, they are not 
citizens, but they are subject to the laws.  This raises important questions concerning the justifiability of laws to such 
persons.  If the laws are not justifiable to them, are they subjects of immoral coercion when those laws are enforced?  
These issues are beyond the scope of this paper, so I set them aside.  I conceive of society as containing only 
citizens, by which I mean those born in the state they inhabit. 
26 Watson and Hartley (2018) note that Quong (2011) is critical of this position, p. 47, n. 13.  They accept this 
approach, which is argued for in Larmore (1999) and Larmore (2008) and perhaps implicit in Rawls’s work. 
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granted and are not concerned with trying to convince those who do not conceive of persons and 
society in this.  This is simply how political liberals typically understand citizens as relating to one 
another in a society conceived of as a fair system of cooperation between moral equals.27  This 
understanding of citizens as free and equal moral persons engaging in a system of social 
cooperation is the basis of consensus views public reason liberalism. 
From this basis of understanding citizens as free and equal moral persons, political liberals 
develop a general duty of respect for persons.  Charles Larmore’s essay “The Moral Basis of 
Political Liberalism” presents an influential account of the role respect plays in political liberalism.  
One of Larmore’s primary intentions was improve upon Rawls’s account by making explicit 
political liberalism’s commitment to respect as a foundational value.28  Rawls argued for what he 
called the liberal principle of legitimacy.  This idea is presented above, but not formally and 
without reference to Rawls.  The liberal principle of legitimacy helps explain why public reason 
is required in the deliberation and justification processes.  Rawls’s account is as follows: 
Liberal Principle of Legitimacy 
Our exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is exercised in 
accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal 
may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals 
acceptable to their common human reason.29 
 
This principle entails that codifying and enforcing laws that are not justifiable to all citizens are 
morally wrong.  Exercising political power that is unjustified to the citizens subject to it represents 
a failure to treat them as free and equal.  This principle is what Vallier calls a principle of 
justification, but recall that consensus accounts of public reason tend to be more concerned with 
deliberative principles.  Convergence theorists, such as Vallier, typically accept a presumption 
 
27 Watson and Hartley (2018), p. 46-7. 
28 Larmore (1999), p. 606. 
29 Rawls (2005), p. 137. 
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against coercion.30  Coercion is almost always morally wrong.  Since the state has a monopoly on 
creating and enforcing law, state action is always coercive.  Thus, the only way that exercises of 
state power are not morally wrong is if such coercive actions are justified to the citizens subject to 
that power.  On the other hand, the reasons that an official appeals to in defense of their position 
in public deliberation are not themselves coercive, and restricting those reasons does not 
necessarily protect against the state being unjustifiably coercive. 
Rawlsian political liberals are also concerned with principles of justification and limiting 
unjustified coercion by the state.  The liberal principle of legitimacy is itself meant to express these 
concerns.  Unless the law is justifiable to those subject to it, its enactment and enforcement is an 
illegitimate (and morally wrong) imposition of state power.  However, they are also concerned 
with how individuals in the public political sphere engage in social cooperation.  Moreover, 
supporting or voting for laws that are not justifiable to all citizens (Vallier’s conception of 
exclusionary public reason) is not the only way in which officials involved in the law-making 
process can wrong the citizens subject to the laws.  They can wrong citizens by failing to provide 
public reasons in support of their favored positions.   
Larmore’s account aims to provide both a clearer and more robust defense of deliberatively 
exclusive public reason by making explicit its moral foundation, which is a general moral duty of 
respect for persons.  If we conceive of citizens as free and equal moral persons, then it is morally 
wrong to base coercion on mere force.  As such persons, coercion must be justified to them.  Thus, 
Larmore argues that the notion of respect that is most important in the context of political 
liberalism in an understanding that “to respect another person as an end is to require that coercion 
or political principles be as justifiable to that person as they presumably are to us.”31  Failing to 
 
30 Vallier (2015), p. 145. 
31 Larmore (1999), p. 608. 
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justify coercion to citizens is a failure to treat them as free and equal moral persons.  Doing so 
treats them as means rather than moral persons who are ends in themselves and deserving of 
respect.32   
Convergent accounts of justificatory principles only require that the laws be justifiable for 
citizens.33  As long as citizens have reasons to find a law justifiable, then the law is justifiable for 
them.  On the other hand, consensus accounts include the element of deliberation by emphasizing 
the importance of justification to those subject to the law.  Respecting citizens as free and equal 
moral persons requires engaging their capacity to reason.34  Those with the power and 
responsibility to impose laws on citizens must present citizens with the reasons that they think 
justify the laws so that the citizens can exercise their capacity to reason and determine if they 
themselves find the law justifiable.  The important question that remains is why these reasons must 
be public.  Why does a general moral duty of respect that requires laws be justified to citizens 
morally bind legislators to defend a proposed law by appeal to public reasons rather than 
comprehensive reasons? 
Public reasons can be found in the culture of a liberal constitutional democracy and do not 
depend on a particular comprehensive doctrine.  They are reasons that all citizens can accept in 
virtue of shared liberal political values.  Additionally, recall that political liberals understand 
society as a project of social cooperation.  If we conceive of society as a shared civil project and 
citizens as free and equal moral persons worthy of respect, terms of social cooperation ought to be 
ones that all citizens have reason to accept.  Thus, justifications of laws by legislators to citizens 
should be presented on public reason bases.  Respecting and engaging cooperatively with one’s 
 
32 Larmore (1999), p. 607-8. 
33 Vallier (2015), p. 142. 
34 Larmore (1999), p. 608. 
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fellow citizens lead to the “common ground” we call public reasons.35  Failing to do so is morally 
disrespectful and insincere.  Let me expand on this last point. 
Respecting the citizens subject to a law as free and equal moral persons requires an official 
to defend laws in terms of public reasons that all can accept.  Why is it that offering comprehensive 
reasons for one’s policy position is disrespectful to citizens?  Offering a non-public reason defense 
of a law by appealing to one’s comprehensive doctrine disrespects one’s fellow citizens because 
respect requires one to treat citizens as free and equal moral persons capable of engaging reasons 
in the deliberative process involved in justification.   
Some political liberals argue that an individual’s public reason defense of a position must 
be sincere.  For example, Micah Schwartzman formulates the following principle: 
Principle of Sincere Public Justification (SPJ): 
A ought to advocate proposal p if, and only if, A (i) believes that (R1 → p), and (ii) 
publicly asserts R1 as sufficient to justify p36 
 
Sincerity requires that the legislator attempting to justify a law to the public believes that the reason 
they offer for the law is both a public reason and that it is a reason sufficient to justify the law.  I 
favor such requirements.  Sincerity is necessary for fulfilling one’s duty to respect one’s fellow 
citizens as moral persons and of one’s duty of civility.  If one offers reasons that they cannot 
sincerely expect others to endorse, then they are not treating their fellow citizens with respect since 
they are supposedly attempting to justify their positions with reasons they cannot expect others to 
endorse.  
At first glance, it might appear that sincerity would allow comprehensive reasons to sneak 
into public justifications.  One might object to sincerity on the grounds that it is does not exclude 
comprehensive reasons from the domain of public reason.  All it requires is that A believes that R1 
 
35 Larmore (1999), p. 611. 
36 Schwartzman (2011), p. 385. 
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is a reason all could share and justifies p.  Since consensus theorists defend exclusive deliberation 
and SPJ does not contribute to making discourse more exclusive, it serves no meaningful role.  
Therefore, we ought to disregard SPJ.  A is not being insincere and so not disrespecting their fellow 
citizens if they truly believe R1 justifies p.  This objection ignores the fact of reasonable pluralism.  
Again, reasonable pluralism is the recognition that life in a liberal democratic society characterized 
by all the freedoms that come with it will include various conceptions of the good life.  Reasonable 
citizens are aware that all citizens do not—and cannot be expected to—share the same 
comprehensive doctrines.  This response also hints at the more complete explanation for why 
violating one’s duty of civility by offering comprehensive reasons in an attempt to justify coercive 
law is disrespectful and morally wrong. 
When a legislator takes part in the deliberative process, they are attempting to convince 
others that a given law is justified.  They are explaining the reasons that they have for supporting 
the law under discussion and why they think their fellow legislators should also vote in favor of 
the piece of legislation.  They are attempting to justify the law to others.  However, in a liberal 
democracy, they are not simply justifying the law to the other members of their chamber.  They 
are also responsible for justifying the law to the citizens subject to the law.  In order to treat those 
citizens with respect, the legislator must address them as free and equal moral persons.  Doing so 
requires the use of public reasons that the legislator can reasonably expect all citizens to endorse.  
This requires shared reasons.   
Consider an alternative way of framing the issue.  Imagine a legislator recognizes that they 
have the responsibility to justify their positions to their fellow citizens, so they engage in the 
justificatory process.  The official is attempting to convince others that a law is justifiable, so the 
official is tasked with giving the citizens reasons that the official reasonably thinks that the citizens 
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could actually accept as justifying the law.  By offering non-public reasons stemming from the 
legislator’s comprehensive doctrine and in violation of one’s duty of civility, the legislator 
disrespects their fellow citizens and makes a mockery of the justificatory process.  The official 
attempts to justify a law by appealing to reasons that they cannot expect others to endorse.  This is 
not a genuine or sincere attempt to justify the law at all.   
To simplify, an individual engaging in the justificatory process can ask themselves the 
following question.  Can I reasonably or sincerely expect others to accept my reasons as grounds 
for adopting a particular policy stance without requiring them to make any particular philosophical, 
religious, or metaphysical commitments—that is, on shared political values alone?  If one’s 
reasons do not give them a positive answer to this question, offering those reasons would be a 
failure to treat others with the respect they are due as persons.  It would violate this duty by offering 
them justificatory reasons that one knows they have no reason to endorse.  This is problematic 
since the motivation for offering justificatory reasons in the first place is to offer one’s reasons as 
sufficient for public justification.  It is disrespectful for A to try to convince B that policy P is 
justified if A gives B reasons that A cannot reasonably expect B to agree with.  A genuine and 
respectful attempt at public justification in public deliberations requires A having a reasonable 
expectation that B would accept the reasons A gives. 
This makes it easy to see where our imaginary Senator from above runs afoul of their duty 
of civility.  The Senator has a task, which is to give justificatory reasons for the bill that allows 
Biblical education in public schools.  In order to carry out this task, the Senator needs to offer 
reasons in favor of the bill that the Senator thinks others could endorse without any particular 
philosophical, religious, or metaphysical commitments.  Due to the fact of reasonable pluralism 
and general background knowledge about the plurality of comprehensive doctrines that exist in a 
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liberal constitutional democracy, the Senator cannot reasonably expect others to support the bill 
on the grounds that the Bible is the whole truth.  Thus, the Senator, in supposedly attempting to 
justify public policy to others, is offering reasons that the Senator cannot expect to have 
justificatory force for other citizens.  This demonstrates how offering comprehensive reasons when 
public reasons are required violates a moral duty to treat other citizens, who are free and equal 
moral persons, with respect.  
Consensus liberalism, then, is in agreement with convergence accounts that public reason 
is exclusionary.  However, they disagree on the sense in which it is so.  Convergence accounts 
require proposal restraint.  Consensus theorists go further by including deliberative principles that 
require individuals to exclude certain reasons from public deliberation.  Attempting to convince 
others that a law is justifiable by giving reasons that one cannot reasonably expect those others to 
endorse violates one’s duty to respect those others as free and equal persons.  Requiring officials 
to exclude reasons they cannot expect others to endorse creates a duty of civility.  Civility demands 
that discourse in the public political forum takes place in terms of public reasons.   
In this section, I have argued that both broad understandings of public reason liberalism 
are exclusionary, albeit in different ways.  Additionally, both views categorize our fictional 
Senator’s actions as morally wrong.  The Senator runs afoul of convergent exclusionary public 
reason by supporting a proposal that is unjustifiable.  Their actions are morally wrong on consensus 
accounts because the reasons they give in favor of the bill are reasons that they ought to exclude 
from their attempts to justify policy in the public political forum.  Is there something that the 
Senator is morally required to do in response to their own wrongdoing?  Can we expect them to 
“right their wrong?”  I now turn to the concept of moral repair.   
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4 DUE DILIGENCE DUTIES OF MORAL REPAIR 
In this section, I argue that government officials who violate the duties of exclusionary public 
reason have a duty to remedy such violations with some form of moral repair on both consensus 
and convergence accounts of public reason.  I argue for what I call a due diligence duty of moral 
repair in cases of violations of one’s duties of exclusionary public reason.  This is because the 
wrongdoer is only responsible for their own actions.37  I examine the different actions wrongdoers 
might take in order to fulfill their due diligence duties of moral repair depending on whether one 
favors convergence or consensus liberalism.  Using the example of the fictional Senator, I argue 
that both conceptions require an apology while violating convergent restraint also requires a 
retraction of one’s support of the policy previously defended.  On the other hand, consensus 
accounts will not necessarily require a retraction of support for the bill if the official can provide 
a public reason defense of the position without appealing to reasons that ought to be excluded from 
public political discourse. 
Exclusionary public reason creates moral duties for individuals in the public political 
forum.  For convergent accounts, this takes the form of proposal restraint.  Reason restraint is 
required by consensus accounts.  These duties are moral duties of restraint on both accounts.  The 
duty of the civility Rawls and consensus theorists consider binding and the principle restraint 
Vallier and convergence liberals favor are both moral rather than legal.  Neither duty is appropriate 
for legal enforcement  in the laws or constitution of a liberal society.  However, this certainly does 
 
37 In what follows, I use ‘wrongdoers’ to refer to those individuals in violation of the duties created by exclusionary 
public reason.  When explaining the concept of moral repair and speaking of wrongdoers in general, I use the phrase 
‘moral wrongdoers.’ 
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not mean that moral duties are not important nor does it mean that we cannot have legitimate 
expectations that moral wrongdoers take certain actions in the after math of their own wrongdoing. 
The literature surrounding moral repair investigates responses to moral wrongdoing.  Key 
concepts that often come up in discussions on moral repair include apology, forgiveness, 
relationships, reparations, compensation, and many others.  We often think that moral wrongdoers 
have a duty to apologize for their wrongdoing or attempt to rectify the situation in some other way. 
Public reason liberals seldom discuss the implications of violating the duties of exclusionary public 
reason.  My aim here is to examine the place of moral repair in relation to violations of the moral 
duties of exclusionary public reason.  If these duties are fundamental moral duties rather than 
expectations of etiquette, then violations of them require some form of moral repair.  What follows 
is an initial attempt to examine what moral repair might look like in such cases. 
The notion that wrongdoers must in some way attempt to right their wrongdoing is not 
new.  However, the study of “moral repair” as a concept itself worthy of in-depth analysis is a 
relatively recent phenomenon.  One of the foundational texts in this growing body of literature is 
Margaret Urban Walker’s Moral Repair: Reconstructing Moral Relations after Wrongdoing 
(2006).  Walker (2006) defines moral repair as “the process of moving from the situation of loss 
and damage to a situation where some degree of stability in moral relations is regained” (p. 6).  
Examining moral repair then requires analysis of responses to moral wrongdoing and determining 
whether it is both possible and necessary to right moral wrong.  Moreover, if moral repair is 
possible and required, we can ask what actions both the moral wrongdoers and those wronged 
might do to rectify the wrongdoing and repair their relations going forward if they ought to.   
It is common to think that moral wrongs ought to be compensated, whether it be through 
material compensation, apology, or some other means.  We think wrongdoers owe those they have 
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wronged something.  We can call duties to redress one’s wrongdoing duties of moral repair.  
However, it is not always clear what is owed.  Repair is often material.  For example, an individual 
(or their insurance company) who is deemed responsible for an automobile accident might fulfill 
their duties of moral repair by paying any and all bills associated with the collision, including the 
other parties’ auto-repair costs and hospital bills. 
Two considerations are in order going forward.  First, framing the discussion concerning 
moral repair in terms of righting wrongs might be problematic since it might not be possible to 
right all, or even any, moral wrongs.  Perhaps moral wrongs are so substantial that they are 
ultimately irreparable, or at least cannot be completely repaired.  It might not be possible to ever 
“move past” or normalize moral relations, to use Walker’s terminology, in the aftermath of some 
cases of moral wrongdoing.  Complete moral repair might be understood as establishing a state of 
affairs in which moral relations are normalized.  Those involved no longer let the wrong impact 
their moral treatment of each other. This might consist in the wrongdoing being repaired, 
forgiveness being offered by the victim, the wrongdoer apologizes, or the parties involved agree 
to effectively move past the wrong.  There might be cases in which complete moral repair seems 
impossible.  The moral relationship between the wrongdoer and victim might be irreparable.  
Something about the moral relationship remains off, and it will never be the same.   
Consider the following scenario in which complete moral repair might not be possible.  
Imagine an individual is killed by a drunk driver.  This individual is the victim of the wrongdoing, 
so it naturally seems that they are the person who is owed moral repair.  But they are dead.  It is 
not possible for the wrongdoer to normalize moral relations with a dead individual, so moral repair 
seems impossible.  However, we might think that moral repair is owed to another party, such as 
the victim’s family.  Drunk drivers responsible for deaths often pay damages, apologize, 
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experience regret, receive license suspensions, and serve jail time for their wrongdoing, but this is 
still not sufficient to repair the wrongdoing.  The victim’s life cannot be replaced, and the wrong 
done to their family members might not be repairable. 
However, even if complete moral repair is unlikely or impossible in a scenario, it does not 
mean that there are no required or appropriate responses in the aftermath of wrongdoing.  We do 
not have to simply move on, and there can still be duties to attempt repair.  Even wrongdoers 
themselves often think they owe their victims or their families something.  For example, the drunk 
driver might recognize they are responsible for the wrongdoing and conclude that they owe an 
apology, material compensation, a demonstration of respect, and so forth.   
This leads to the second clarification.  Individual wrongdoers have duties of moral repair, 
but these duties do not necessarily include a duty to create or produce a morally reparative state of 
affairs.  Moral wrongdoers have what I call due diligence duties of moral repair. This means that 
they have a moral duty to take actions that, given that facts of the situation, amount to a genuine 
and reasonable attempt to repair relations with those they have wronged.  By making a genuine 
and reasonable attempt at moral repair, a moral wrongdoer does their due diligence to fulfill their 
duty of moral repair.   
Given that complete moral repair takes place when moral relations are normalized, I 
conceptualize duties of moral repair on behalf of the wrongdoer as due diligence duties for two 
reasons.  The first is that complete repair is not always possible.  It cannot be that case that, since 
complete moral repair is impossible, the drunk driver has no duties of moral repair.  Nor can it be 
that case that they have a duty of complete moral repair.  They cannot have a duty to do the 
impossible.  But surely the driver must do something, so their duty of moral repair must be a duty 
to do their due diligence to repair relations.  They must make a genuine and reasonable attempt at 
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moral repair that is appropriate based on the facts of the case.  By reasonable, I simply mean that 
the repair required is appropriate for the context and proportionate to the wrongdoing.  For an 
attempt at repair to be genuine, the wrongdoer must accept responsibility for the wrongdoing and 
sincerely think that their response is reasonable given the circumstances of the wrongdoing. 
The second complication that leads to a due diligence requirement is that establishing 
normalized relationships is a two-way street.  The relationship is not normalized if one individual 
considers it disrupted, and the moral wrongdoer cannot normalize relations on their own.  In other 
words, both the victim and the wrongdoer must converge on the conclusion (possibly implicitly) 
that the wrongdoing has been sufficiently morally compensated for in order for relations to be 
normalized.  I understand moral compensation broadly as compensation for moral wrongdoing 
that can come in many different forms.  Material compensation, apology, truth-telling, promises 
of future conduct, and so forth can all serve as forms of moral compensation depending on the 
context of the wrongdoing.  If a wrongdoer genuinely commits reasonable actions of moral repair 
to fulfill their duties of due diligence but the victim refuses to forgive, the wrong can be morally 
compensated for without normalized relations.  So, due diligence duties are duties to offer or 
supply moral compensation rather than duties to actually create a state of moral repair.  The latter 
requires acceptance that the wrong has been compensated for by all those involved. 
Consider the following example.  If you accidentally but negligently bump into a stranger 
on the sidewalk, you might have a duty to offer a simple apology.  For complete moral repair to 
take place, the stranger would have to accept your apology and forgive you.  If they do not forgive 
you and begrudge you, then the moral relations between the two of you have not been normalized.  
However, it seems that given you have fulfilled your duties of moral repair in such a case.  You 
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have done all due diligence requires.  Genuinely apologizing to the stranger is a reasonable 
response to and sufficient moral compensation for accidentally bumping into them. 
Given that moral repair requires both recognition that the wrong has been compensated for 
and a return or establishment of normalized relations by both parties, it might appear as though 
victims can have duties of moral repair.  Such a duty would be a duty of forgiveness, and perhaps 
there are situations in which it seems warranted to claim that someone who has been wronged has 
such a duty.  For example, the individual who is bumped into on the sidewalk might have a duty 
to forgive (especially if it was clearly an accident and not intentional), but we might be hesitant to 
claim that the family members of the drunk-driving victim have a parallel duty.  Forgiveness as a 
phenomenon and the possibility of duties of forgiveness raise interesting questions, and there is an 
ever-growing body of literature on the topic.   
The focus of this paper is to examine whether the concept of moral repair has a place in 
public reason politics.  As a result, I focus on a particular type of wrongdoer and whether they 
might have duties of moral repair.  If they have such duties, I outline  how they might go about 
fulfilling such duties. Despite the importance of forgiveness, I do not focus on the victims of 
wrongdoing and their role in moral repair.  Thus, my discussion of moral repair is limited to duties 
of due diligence on part of the wrongdoer.  
5 UNDERSTANDING DUTIES OF REPAIR 
In Section 2, I argued that both consensus and convergence liberalism are both forms of 
exclusionary public reason liberalism and that failures by legislators to be exclusive in the manner 
required by a given conception constitutes a moral wrong.  Given this, we might ask whether such 
wrongs are sufficient to generate duties of moral repair.  Perhaps all moral wrongs do not generate 
duties of moral repair.  Perhaps you do not have a duty of moral repair in the sidewalk-bumping 
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situation above.  Andrew I. Cohen distinguishes between two frameworks we might use to 
understand and justify duties of moral repair—associativism and reductionism.38  I argue that it 
does not matter which of these frameworks one thinks best justifies such duties.  Either 
understanding of the justification of duties of moral repair justifies due diligence duties of moral 
repair in response to violations of one’s duties to engage in exclusionary public reason.   
 
5.1 Associativism 
Associativist accounts of duties of moral repair justify such duties on the grounds of relationships.  
Relationships can have normatively significant elements that are sufficient to generate duties of 
repair.39  When the norms of relationships are violated, this ought to be rectified.  I argue that 
consensus and convergent accounts of public reason can satisfy associativist justifications of moral 
repair.  
Consider consensus accounts of public reason.  Such accounts conceive of the source of 
duties of moral repair as grounded in the relationships of equal democratic citizens.  The fact that 
citizens are conceived as free and equal gives rise to significant normative expectations for how 
they relate to one another. Among such expectations is the duty to offer citizens public reason 
justifications.  Treating others as equals requires justifying one’s decisions to those affected by 
them.  Thus, by offering comprehensive reasons that one cannot expect others to endorse due to 
reasonable pluralism, a legislator transgresses the norms regulating the relationships between them 
and those who are subject to the laws.  This transgression is a sort of relationship damage. This 
transgression generates a duty to repair the relationship. 
 
38 Cohen (2018), p. 186-8. 
39 Cohen (2018), p. 186-7.   
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Convergence accounts tend to emphasize coercive power as one reason that public 
justifications are necessary.  We might understand the relationship that is significant in generating 
duties of moral repair to be one of law-creator and law-follower.40  The official plays a role in the 
codification and enforcement of coercive law.  The relationship between legislator and other 
citizens is characterized by a power dynamic that favors the legislator.  However, the legislator is 
only justified in exercising this power on the grounds that it is justified for the citizens.  As a result, 
if the official offers proposals that are not intelligible for all citizens, then the legislator has violated 
the norms of the relationship between legislator and the public as conceived by convergence 
accounts.  Thus, there is a duty to repair the relationship.  
Alternatively, we might look at both views democratically.  Both conceptions of public 
reason liberalism focus on democratic societies.  In such societies, legislators are authorized to 
take part in the process of creating laws, and their constituents are subjected to those laws.  Elected 
officials in democratic societies are collectively granted the authority to exercise political power 
by the citizens of that society.  Now, of course, the official cannot equally represent the interests 
of each constituent.  However, they can refrain from attempting to exercise power on grounds that 
their constituents cannot all be expected to endorse.  In attempting to justify a law with 
comprehensive reasons, an elected official transgresses the relationship they have with their 
constituents, some of whom cannot be expected to agree with those comprehensive reasons.  
Likewise, the official has a duty to justify the laws they help create to those who must abide by 
them, especially since the authorization to create laws is given by the citizens subjected to them.  
 
40 There is some overlap here with the previous explanation of consensus liberalism.  However, the emphasis is 
slightly different.  On consensus accounts, the emphasis is on the fact that legislators and other citizens are free and 
equal and relate to one another in a certain way.  On convergence accounts, the fact that the legislator has influence 
on the exercise of coercive power plays a significant role. 
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By failing to exercise political power on grounds acceptable to those who authorized that power, 
officials transgress the relationships between themselves and other democratic citizens. 
The public reason framework provides reasons in favor of duties of moral repair according 
to an associativist account of such duties.  There are normatively significant relationships between 
elected officials and other democratic citizens, and transgressions of these relationships occur 
when elected officials violate their duty of civility.  Both consensus and convergence accounts 
give reason to justify duties of moral repair.  I now turn to a reductionist justification of duties of 
moral repair. 
5.2 Reductionism 
Reductionist accounts can motivate duties of moral repair by appeal to moral duties owed to 
persons independent of particular relationships.41  Instead of appealing to any special, reason-
giving relationships between elected officials and other citizens, reductionism focuses on explicitly 
moral duties.  Recall that consensus views recognize a moral duty of respect for persons.  This 
duty does not rely on particular relationships, and it applies to all persons at all times.  All moral 
persons are owed respect, and all others have a duty to treat them as worthy of respect.  Violating 
the duty of civility is a violation of the moral duty of respect for persons.  Thus, there is also a 
reductionist explanation of how duties of moral repair arise within the consensus framework.  
Failing to offer public reasons is a moral transgression independent of special relationships because 
such actions disrespect moral persons.  The moral duty to respect others as persons creates an 
obligation for all people whenever they interact with others.  Thus, the reductionist can justify 
duties of moral repair by appealing to the fact that any failure to offer public reasons when required 
can be explained in terms of a violation of the moral duty of respect for persons.  
 
41 Cohen (2018), p. 187. 
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Convergence accounts also have a reductionist basis.  Recall that they are based in a general 
presumption against coercion.  Coercion is always morally wrong unless it is justifiable for those 
subject to it.  Laws are coercive.  Therefore, laws are morally wrong unless they are justifiable for 
those subject to them.  If legislators fail to restrain themselves from publicly supporting or voting 
for unjustifiable proposals, they attempt to exercise unjustified coercive power.  Violations of 
convergent restraint give sufficient grounds for moral repair because they violate a reductionist 
moral presumption against unjustified coercion. 
In this section, I argued that we can justify duties of moral repair for elected officials who 
violate their duties of restraint on either public reason framework.  I argued that it does not matter 
whether we accept an associativist or reductionist account as the source of duties of moral repair.  
Both approaches to public reason can justify duties of moral repair in both associativist and 
reductionist terms. Public reason liberalism generates such duties on either account.  How elected 
officials might go about carrying out their duties of moral repair when they violate the duty of 
civility is the focus of the next section. 
One might object to the claim that public reason accounts are more suited to reductionist 
justifications of moral repair.  The arguments of Section 2 defend exclusionary public reason on 
reductionist grounds, so we should focus on reductionist justifications of moral repair.  This is a 
reasonable response to the argument of this section.  However, I do not see the need to argue for 
one account over the other.  If public reason liberalism generates duties of moral repair on either 
account, this is a good thing.  It does not matter which approach to justifying duties of moral repair 
one favors, one can understand public reason as generating such duties.  Similarly, one might 
wonder how reductionist duties explain the process of moral repair.  Above, I followed Walker 
(2006) by discussing the actual act of moral repair in terms of normalizing relationships.  If 
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reductionist accounts do not justify moral repair by appeal to relationship damage, how can moral 
repair take the form of relationship repair?  In response, what justifies moral repair and how moral 
repair is to be assessed and carried out are two separate questions.  Even if we do not think that 
relationship damage is what justifies moral repair, we can still think that violations of reductionist 
moral values disrupt relationships and use relationships as a benchmark for moral repair.  I now 
turn to how moral repair might be carried out by legislators, such as our fictional Senator, who 
have violated the norms of exclusionary public reason. 
 
6 MORAL REPAIR AND PUBLIC REASON 
Public reason liberalism provides us with reasons to conclude that our fictional Senator has duties 
of moral repair.  These duties require that the Senator do their due diligence in normalizing the 
relationship between them and citizens based on the situation.  However, it is not clear what due 
diligence requires.  What is required for the Senator to make a genuine and reasonable attempt to 
rectify their wrongdoing?  What follows is an initial attempt to formulate duties of moral repair on 
public reason accounts of wrongdoing.  I argue that both consensus and convergence accounts 
require the Senator to offer a public apology.  Apology alone, however, will often be insufficient.  
Given their different conceptions of duties of restraint, consensus accounts might require the 
apology to be paired with a defense of their previously favored position in terms of public reason 
and convergence accounts require the apology to be coupled with a retraction of support for the 
policy. 
There are various routes to moral repair.  For example, a thief might apologize, or, the thief 
might return, replace, or pay for a stolen item, or both.  Let us assume we accept a reasonable 
standard that the repair owed be proportionate to the transgression.  First, there is no obvious 
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method for determining the material compensation proportionate to failing to offer public reasons.  
How much does disrespect cost?  Likewise, what is the price of exercising unjustified coercion?  
Remember, public reason liberalism is concerned only with moral rather than legal wrongs, so no 
repair can be enforced.  Furthermore, exclusionary duties are duties to all other citizens.  Even at 
a small cost per person, material compensation would be infeasible and likely creates a cumulative 
burden on the wrongdoer that is disproportionate to the wrongdoing.  Therefore, I set this aside.  
We need another way for our transgressors to fulfill their duties of due diligent moral repair. 
Apology is a common example of a morally reparative action.  Apologies, like material 
compensation, can serve as a starting point for moral repair.  Apologies commonly acknowledge 
a transgression, express regret, and accept culpability.42  These functions are often part of the 
process of moral repair.  When a victim recognizes that the transgressor finds their own actions 
morally problematic, repair can take place.  For example, if a friend commits a moral transgression 
by breaking a promise, an apology can be morally reparative by helping to restore trust.  The 
example of bumping the stranger on the street is a case in which due diligence might only require 
a simple, straightforward apology. 
Given the nature of public reason wrongdoing, apology initially appears as capable of 
serving some morally reparative function.  On consensus accounts, apologies can repair 
relationships by serving as a recognition that a norm was violated.  This can reinforce trust and 
express regret, and the apology itself can express respect by serving as a recognition that some 
wrongdoing occurred.  Thus, it is a way to restore the respect that is expected of the relations 
between free and equal moral persons.  Apology is also a promising option in cases of wrongdoing 
on convergence accounts.  Given that the legislator has supported or voted for a proposal that is 
 
42 Cohen (2018), p. 180. 
36 
unjustifiable to those subject to it, it is reasonable to expect that the legislator apologize for this 
wrongdoing.  Apologies are an appealing option for moral repair since they are not overly 
burdensome.  They do not require any substantial financial or material compensation, but they can 
serve many other important functions mentioned above, such as expressing regret.   
Another reason to favor apologies as a means of moral repair is that they require a public 
verbal or written expression that the wrongdoer recognizes that they did something wrong.  
Material compensation, truth-telling, favor-doing are other options for moral repair, but there is no 
way to verify that they are genuine.  Of course, apologies can be insincere as well.  However, they 
are an improvement over other means since they at least require the wrongdoer to accept 
responsibility, should not have committed the wrong, and that they regret doing so.  So, there are 
good reasons to include a duty of apology in the duties of moral repair in public reason. 
What might such an apology by an elected official who violates the duty of civility look 
like?43  First, the transgression is a violation of a duty to all democratic citizens.  Treating such 
citizens with respect requires that they be addressed as free and equal citizens.  Offering 
comprehensive reasons does not address citizens in this way, so the transgression is committed 
against all members of the public, even those who agree with the comprehensive reasons because 
it fails to offer them reasons that they can be expected to endorse without comprehensive 
commitments.  Consequently, the apology for this transgression ought to be addressed to the 
public.  However, there is no need for this apology to be an extravagant affair, but it must be 
communicated to the public.  This might take the form of a social media post, a newspaper ad, or 
a television commercial.  All of these could serve as platforms to communicate an apology to the 
 
43 This paper concerns how elected officials might respond to their own individual wrongdoing.  How such 
individuals might respond to wrongdoing by the state or other state actors is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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public.  Although such an apology might include statements of culpability, regret, and 
acknowledging a transgression, apology alone might be insufficient.   
A simple public apology on its own is not enough to fulfill the duties of moral repair 
because such an apology faces several practical problems.  It would be difficult to confirm that the 
apology is genuine, and democratic citizens often have little trust in elected officials to begin with, 
especially those who admit to wrongdoing.  Thus, apology alone is likely to do little for moral 
repair, which means that it fails to give those wronged reasonable grounds for forgiving the 
transgression or trusting that the wrongdoer will fulfill their moral duties in the future.  It does not 
satisfy the due diligence requirement.   
Given that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to verify if an apology is genuine, we might 
ask if apologies can be supplemented with other actions that might serve moral repair.  As long as 
such possibilities are reasonable responses to the wrongdoing and not overly burdensome, they are 
good candidates.  For violations of civility according to consensus accounts, a reasonable option 
is that the legislator offer public reasons defend their policy position.  Public reasons were morally 
required in the first place.  Their absence constituted the transgression.  The official treats other 
citizens wrongly simply by offering comprehensive reasons in the public political forum, so 
offering public reasons might be one way to attempt to repair the wrong.   
Consider the case in which the official apologizes and retracts support for their previously 
defended policy alternative.  The Senator might publicly state that they were wrong to assert that 
the Bible being the whole truth is a reason in favor of bill.  However, a retraction such as this will 
often be problematic in practice because it is unlikely to be regarded as sincere by the public.  
Again, given democratic citizens’ distrust in their elected officials, it is not likely that they will 
receive a retraction as genuine.  It is reasonable to suspect citizens to interpret the retraction as an 
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attempt to “save face.”  If one offered a genuine apology and sincerely retracted their support for 
the position, this might be a viable route to moral repair.  However, such a case faces problems, 
so, assuming they still favor the policy, actually offering a public reason defense of the proposal 
is a better option.   
If an elected official attaches public reasons to their apology, might this help in the process 
of moral repair?  Public reasons treat citizens how they ought to be treated, so offering them would 
be one way to combat the skepticism an apology alone might face.  Although offering public 
reasons does not erase the previous transgression, they represent a new mode of treatment that 
fulfills the duty of civility.  This treatment would give citizens some grounds on which they can 
possibly trust or forgive the elected official.  Thus, apology alone is not enough for moral repair, 
but coupling an apology with public reasons that genuinely treat citizens with respect represent a 
reasonable expectation for actions a transgressor might take in order to fulfill their duties of moral 
repair.  It seems like such an action would make moral repair possible, which is all due diligence 
requires. 
I have just argued that apologies need to be coupled with public reasons to fulfill duties of 
moral repair.  However, one might object that it appears that public reasons are doing the morally 
reparative work.  Why do we need apology?  In response, public reasons alone are insufficient for 
fulfilling duties of moral repair because they do not express any regret or culpability.  Moreover, 
they need not even acknowledge a transgression.  Simply offering public reasons makes no claims 
about the moral status of one’s previous act of offering comprehensive reasons.  The Senator has 
disrespected their fellow citizens by attempting to justify a bill to them on religious grounds.  
Offering political reasons at a later time does not even necessarily include an implicit 
acknowledgment that they initially disrespected their fellow citizens.  Thus, public reasons alone 
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do not amount to a real attempt to make moral repair possible.  Coupling an offering of public 
reasons with an apology would be a way for the wrongdoer to fulfill their duty of civility while 
explicitly accepting responsibility and expressing regret for their wrongdoing.  This provides a 
firmer ground for moral repair by giving the public reasons to forgive or move past the 
wrongdoing.    
Convergence accounts, however, do not have the option of appealing to public reasons to 
supplement apology since they do not restrain reasons.  So, if apology alone is not enough for due 
diligence, convergence will need another way to express that the apology is sincere and that the 
wrongdoer accepts culpability.  Given that convergence accounts favor proposal restraint, a 
candidate to supplement apology is a retraction.  The official should publicly denounce their 
support of the policy they previously supported since this policy is not justifiable to all those 
subject to it.  They should have never supported it in the first place.  By making it known that they 
no longer support their wrongdoing and promise not to in the future, the individual can give the 
public a reason to move toward seeing their relationship as repaired.  Supplementing an apology 
with a retraction of support for an unjustifiable position seems like a genuine and reasonable 
attempt to fulfill one’s duties of moral repair.   
Violations of both consensus and convergent duties of restrain in public political discourse 
are wrongs to the citizens subject to the law. One promising step that legislators might take in 
righting these wrongs is to offer an apology.  Apologies can signal that the wrongdoer accepts 
responsibility and express regret.  Moreover, since they can be easily disseminated to the public, 
there are reasons to think that due diligence requires an apology.  However, apologies are not 
always genuine, and it is difficult to assess when they are.  Therefore, fulfilling one’s duties of 
moral repair might require supplementing apology with other morally compensatory acts, such as 
40 
providing public reasons or retracting support for one’s position on consensus and convergence 
accounts, respectively.   
 
7 CONCLUSION 
In this paper, I argued that public reason liberalism favors duties of moral repair when legislators 
fail to practice restraint in the public political domain.  The requirements of constraint differ 
depending on the account of public reason, but consensus and convergence approaches require 
exclusionary restraint.  The former requires legislators to exclude certain reasons from public 
political discourse, while the latter requires them to refrain from supporting certain proposals of 
law or policy.   
Public reason liberals typically neglect discussing enforcement of duties of restraint.  In 
other words, are there appropriate actions wrongdoers, victims, or even third parties might take in 
response to violations of such duties?  For example, Vallier simply notes that duties of restraint 
are moral duties rather than legal duties,44 so they can only be enforced by “criticism, 
disapprobation, praise, etc.”45  But this is only a brief note on how others might treat a wrongdoer 
in the aftermath of a wrong.  We often think individuals have duties to right their wrongs.  It is 
important to ask if this is the case in public reason liberalism, and, if so, how wrongdoers might 
go about it.  This paper serves as an initial investigation into such matters.   
I argued that wrongdoers have duties to do their due diligence to repair their wrongdoing.  
Since repair requires actions from all parties involved, such as forgiveness by the victim, due 
diligence requires wrongdoers to make genuine and reasonable attempts at repairing their 
 
44 Public reason liberals are in agreement on this point. 
45 Vallier (2015), p. 142. 
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wrongdoing.  I suggest that legislators in violation of their duties of restraint can do their due 
diligence by offering a public apology for their wrongdoing and also offering public reasons or 
retracting support for their position, depending on the nature of their wrongdoing according to a 
specific account of exclusionary public reason.  How moral repair ought to occur is highly 
dependent on the situation, but these broad suggestions can serve as the basis of future 
examinations of how the concept of moral repair fits into the public reason framework. 
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